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INTRODUCTION 
From October 2009 to February 2010, Alex Footman worked as a production 
intern on the Oscar-winning film Black Swan, where he spent his days 
filling coffee pots, taking out the trash, getting lunch for the staff, and 
cleaning floors.1 Black Swan went on to make more than $300 million, but 
Footman, a graduate of Wesleyan University’s well-known film studies 
program, received no compensation.2 When asked whether he had gained 
experience from the position, Alex replied, “The only thing I learned on this 
internship was to be more picky in choosing employment opportunities.”3 
Diana Wang is also no stranger to unpaid internships. In trying to break 
into competitive industries like publishing and public relations, she went 
through seven.4 Her most recent stint was at Harper’s Bazaar, and she de-
scribed her time there as “disgusting.”5 Her normal workday consisted of 
shipping merchandise between New York and London, carrying heavy bags 
throughout Manhattan, working through dinner, and finally leaving the 
office at around 10 PM.6 She even served a management function at the 
company, overseeing eight other interns.7 Yet she, like them, made nothing.8 
The banality and lack of value in the work given to unpaid interns is a 
common complaint. Marra Green, for example, had an unpaid internship at 
the Diane von Furstenberg fashion house in Manhattan, where she felt “as if 
she was . . . her boss’s valet.”9 In discussing her internship, Ms. Green said, “I 
did a lot of lunch runs. I also did some weird personal errands. I picked up 
clothes which my boss ordered from the store. I returned her children’s clothes 
to various stores. I went to Barneys to pick up Christmas presents . . . .”10  
 
† Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. Candidate, 2014, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, Villanova University. I am grateful to 
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Kirsten Boreen, Sarah Besnoff, and Chris Martin for their help in 
editing this Comment. All errors are, of course, my own. 
1 Steven Greenhouse, Interns, Unpaid by a Studio, File Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at B3. 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-as-we-
know-it. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Steven Greenhouse, The Uses and Misuses of Unpaid Internships, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/the-uses-and-misuses-of-unpaid-internships. 
10 Id. Stories like these, however, are not limited to recent graduates or current students. 
Kristina Shands is thirty-eight and lost her job in the hard-hit nonprofit industry during the 
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This year, some unpaid interns have begun to fight back.11 Footman and 
another intern who worked on Black Swan won a lawsuit in federal court 
against Fox Searchlight Pictures.12 They alleged that the production company 
violated minimum wage and overtime laws by not compensating more than 
one hundred interns.13 The complaint stated, “Fox Searchlight’s unpaid 
interns are a crucial labor force on its productions, functioning as production 
assistants and bookkeepers and performing secretarial and janitorial 
work. . . . Fox Searchlight has denied them the benefits that the law affords 
to employees . . . .”14 Similarly, Diana Wang and her fellow interns filed a 
class-action lawsuit against the Hearst Corporation, which owns Harper’s 
Bazaar, in which they claimed that Hearst’s treatment of its interns violated 
federal and state labor laws.15 
While these two lawsuits against major corporations are the most prom-
inent, similar claims are certain to arise as the pool of unpaid interns keeps 
growing and as interns continue to become disgruntled after their unsatisfying, 
uncompensated experiences.16 Yet when judges finally hear these cases, they 
will have little case law and only vague instructions from the Department of 
Labor to guide them.17  
My proposal is that, in assessing unpaid internship cases, judges should 
borrow the doctrine of consideration from contract law to decide whether there 
really is an employment relationship. Under such a system, if the employer 
and intern exchanged mutually induced promises, then an employment 
relationship exists that requires (1) at least the minimum wage in compli-
ance with the Fair Labor Standards Act18 and (2) the typical employee 
protections against harassment and discrimination in compliance with the 
 
recession. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Working for Free: The Boom in Adult Interns, TIME (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1977130,00.html. In an effort to find employ-
ment in a different field, she began interning with the Knoxville Ice Bears hockey team, distrib-
uting programs and writing game summaries—for free. Id.  
11 See Greenhouse, supra note 1; Sanburn, supra note 4. 
12 Steven Greenhouse, Judge Rules That Movie Studio Should Have Been Paying Interns, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2013, at B1. 
13 Greenhouse, supra note 1. 
14 Complaint ¶ 3, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140 
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013).  
15 Sanburn, supra note 4. Marra Green, as of the time of this writing, appears not to have 
taken legal action.  
16 See infra Section I.B. At least one law firm, Schneider & Rubin, LLC, seems poised to try 
to capitalize on this emerging field of litigation. Schneider & Rubin, LLC, Schneider & Rubin, LLC 
Company Profile, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/company/internlaw-com-schneider-&-rubin-llc 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (profiling a new law firm, Schneider & Rubin, LLC, which will be 
dedicated to litigation on behalf of interns). 
17 See infra Section I.B. 
18 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
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Civil Rights Act,19 Americans with Disabilities Act,20 and the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act.21 
In this Comment, I discuss the need for, details of, and advantages of 
my proposal. In Part I, I provide a background of unpaid internships in the 
United States to display their pervasiveness and their negative effects on 
our country. In Part II, I lay out the test I propose judges use when deter-
mining the legality of unpaid internships. In Part III, I demonstrate how 
this test will work in the courts by applying it to six concrete examples that 
range from the clearest illegal scenario to the clearest legal scenario. Finally, 
in Part IV, I discuss and counter potential challenges to my proposal. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 
A. Origins 
Any history of unpaid internships must begin with the passage of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),22 in 1938, which President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt called “the most farsighted program for the benefit of 
workers ever adopted.”23 Passed during the Great Depression in response to 
injustices to the working class,24 this monumental piece of legislation had 
three primary objectives:  
to establish minimum wages, to discourage the employment of workers for long 
hours by providing that wage payments for all hours in excess of the statutory 
maximum shall be at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate, and to discourage the employment of oppressive child labor.25  
The Act’s overarching purpose is to ensure a “minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being . . . without substantially 
curtailing employment.”26 For this Comment, the most relevant provisions 
 
19 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 
2012) (protecting employees and job applicants from employment discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin). 
20 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
21 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
22 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
23 Laura Fitzpatrick, The Minimum Wage, TIME (July 24, 2009), http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1912408,00.html.  
24 Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, 26 (noting that proponents of the bill wanted to 
end oppressive child labor and unnecessarily long working hours). 
25 Edwin M. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–1945, 59 HARV. L. 
REV. 321, 321 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
26 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b). 
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of the FLSA are the definitions of employee, the minimum wage, 27 and the 
one and one half–time overtime rate.28  
The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an em-
ployer.”29 “Employ,” under the FLSA, means “to suffer or permit to work.”30 
The Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,31 however, narrowed 
this definition so that “‘employ’ does not make all persons employees who, 
without any express or implied compensation agreement, may work for their 
own advantage on the premises of another.”32 In response to heightened 
criticism of unpaid internships, the Department of Labor released Fact Sheet 
#71 (the Fact Sheet) to clarify when an intern is an “employee” deserving 
minimum wage and overtime rates.33 
According to the Act, “an employer [must] pay the prescribed minimum 
wage ‘to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce.’”34 The intent here “was to insure that 
every person whose employment contemplated compensation should not be 
compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum wage.”35 
Thus, if an intern is an “employee” under the meaning of the FLSA, she is 
entitled to the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour36 and one and one-half 
times that rate if she works more than forty hours per week.37 
 
27 Id. § 206. 
28 Id. § 207. 
29 Id. § 203(e)(1). 
30 Id. § 203(g). 
31 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947). 
32 See Letter from Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, FLSA2004-5NA (May 17, 2004) 
[hereinafter Letter from Wage and Hour Division] (addressee’s name omitted for privacy purposes), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2004/2004_05_17_05FLSA_NA_ internship.pdf. 
33  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PRO-
GRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/ 
regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. For a detailed discussion of the Fact 
Sheet, see infra Section I.B. 
34 Dodd, supra note 25, at 324 (citation omitted). 
35 Walling, 330 U.S. at 152. 
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 2012) (declaring that the current minimum wage is 
$7.25 per hour); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 23 (noting the historical minimum wage rates). 
37 See FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“Interns in the ‘for-profit’ private sector who qualify as 
employees rather than trainees typically must be paid at least the minimum wage and overtime 
compensation for hours worked over forty in a workweek.”). 
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B. Description of the Current State of the Law  
The number of unpaid internships has been increasing since the recession.38 
Unpaid internships have tended to be most popular in industries like media, 
communications, entertainment, and publishing. In such fields, industry 
experiences and achievements are necessary qualifications for a job.39 
Moreover, unpaid internships are particularly prevalent among small 
businesses, “which often look to save money while benefiting from the 
productivity of the students they hire.”40  
Exactly how many unpaid internships have been added since the recession, 
or even the exact number of unpaid interns currently working, however, is 
difficult to calculate because the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor 
Statistics does not track the number of unpaid internships.41 Despite this 
empirical deficiency, the United States saw increasing skepticism of unpaid 
internships, beginning in early 2010. Most notably, President Obama’s 
Administration called unpaid internships “abusive and unfair because less-
affluent students can’t afford to spend a summer working as an unpaid 
intern.”42 Additionally, in April 2010, the Economic Policy Institute 
 
38 See Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2010, at B1 
(stating that “[e]mployers posted 643 unpaid internships on Stanford’s job board in [the 2009–
2010] academic year, more than triple the 174 posted two years [prior]”); Tahmnicioglu, supra note 
10 (noting that both Monster.com and Careerbuilder.com have seen increases in the number of 
unpaid internships since the recession); see also Adam Barnosky, Labor of Love: Unpaid Internships in 
the Music Industry, PERFORMER MAG. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://performermag.com/labor-of-love-
unpaid-internships-in-the-music-industry (noting that in the music industry, “[t]he prevalence of 
‘unpaid’ internships has increased over the past several years”); Nicholas Pologeorgis, The Impact 
Unpaid Internships Have on the Labor Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/impact-of-unpaid-internships.asp (listing new 
internship coordinators and consultants and the economic recession as some of the reasons for this 
exponential growth).  
39 See Kaitlin Madden, The Ongoing Debate over Unpaid Internships, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-14/classified/chi-unpaid-internship-rules-20120214_1_ 
unpaid-internships-companies-in-competitive-industries-past-interns (quoting Heather Huhman, 
founder of the public relations firm Come Recommended, as stating that “[u]npaid internships are 
common in media, communications, writing, and other creative fields” because these fields rely 
more on experience). 
40 Peter W. Fulham, Unpaid Interns and Labor Laws: Gaining Experience, Enduring Abuse, POL. 
DAILY (May 12, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/12/unpaid-interns-labor-laws-students- 
experience-abuse. 
41 See id. (“There is no official count of unpaid interns in the U.S. . . . .”); Stephanie Stein-
berg, Unpaid Internships Can Cost—or Pay Off for—College Students, USA TODAY ( July 26, 2010), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-07-27-internship27_ST_N.htm (“The Department 
of Labor and the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not track the number of paid and unpaid intern-
ships.”). 
42 Brann & Isaacson, Hiring Unpaid Interns: Advice for Employers, 16 EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2011, at 
4; see also Greenhouse, supra note 38 (quoting Nancy J. Leppink, the acting director of the 
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launched a comprehensive critique of unpaid internships on three distinct 
grounds: (1) a majority of interns are unprotected against harassment and 
discrimination because they do not qualify as employees, and therefore are 
not afforded employee protections; (2) the current state of the law promotes 
the growth of unpaid internships, which are often limited to wealthy individ-
uals who can afford to work for free; and (3) the availability of “free labor” 
encourages employers to replace regular employees with unpaid interns.43 
In response to these criticisms and to increased scrutiny by state gov-
ernments of unpaid internships,44 in April 2010, the Department of Labor 
released the Fact Sheet to clarify when an unpaid intern is an “employee” 
who must be paid under the FLSA.45 This report is meant to restate the 
pertinent law as promulgated in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.46 and the 
FLSA—not to reflect a change to existing law and jurisprudence regarding 
unpaid internships.47 Furthermore, though these guidelines are not as 
authoritative as the FLSA or a court ruling, Judge Pauley in Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc.—the only case yet to address the issue of unpaid 
internships—held that the Fact Sheet was “entitled to deference” and 
adopted the entire six-point test in his opinion.48  
For an unpaid internship to be legal under the Fact Sheet, it must adhere 
to the following six criteria:  
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities 
of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an edu-
cational environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, who said that there are few circumstances where a 
for-profit employer can offer unpaid internships and “still be in compliance with the law”). 
43 See Kathryn Anne Edwards & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Not-So-Equal Protection: Re-
forming the Regulation of Student Internships, POL’Y MEMORANDUM (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Washington, 
D.C.), Apr. 9, 2010, at 1, available at http://epi.3cdn.net/f7d635c82f7380fff0_8sm6bxrzk.pdf. 
44 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (stating that officials in Oregon, California, and other states 
have increased investigations of unpaid internships and fined employers). 
45 FACT SHEET, supra note 33. 
46 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947) (holding that the word “employ” does not make all persons who 
work on another’s premises “employees” and outlining the “trainee” exception).  
47 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“The U.S. Department of Labor, concerned about companies 
taking advantage of interns, reissued guidelines in the spring that have been in effect since 1947, 
when the Supreme Court established rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act that employers 
must follow to offer unpaid internships.”). 
48 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140, at *12 (S.D.N.Y June 
11, 2013) (stating that the Fact Sheet’s factors have “support in Walling” and “are entitled to 
deference”). It is unclear whether judges in future cases will adopt the Fact Sheet, as Judge Pauley 
did, or stray from it. 
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3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close 
supervision of existing staff; 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate ad-
vantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations 
may actually be impeded; 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the 
internship; and 
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled 
to wages for the time spent in the internship.49  
If an internship does not satisfy these criteria, the intern is an “employee,” 
not a “trainee.”50 These criteria apply only to for-profit firms; interns at 
nonprofit organizations are classified as volunteers under the FLSA and are 
thereby excluded.51 
An important aspect of this test is that it is conjunctive—that is, every 
prong must be satisfied for the intern not to be classified as “employed.”52 
The language of the test appears to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant. The Fact Sheet states that “[i]nternships in the ‘for-profit’ private 
sector will most often be viewed as employment, unless the test described 
[above] relating to trainees is met.”53 The word “unless” seems to indicate 
that internships in the for-profit sector are presumed to be employment, and 
the defendant can rebut this presumption only by showing that its internship 
program adheres to the six-prong test. 
 
49 FACT SHEET, supra note 33; see also Are Unpaid Internships Legal in Ontario?, ONTARIO MINIS-
TRY OF LAB. (2011), available at http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/is_unpaidintern.php 
(putting forth almost identical criteria for the legality of unpaid internships in Ontario, Canada). 
50 Because the intern is an “employee,” he is entitled at least to a minimum wage and over-
time rates. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring that employees be paid at least 
the minimum wage); FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“[I]ndividuals who are ‘suffered or permitted’ 
to work must be compensated under the law for the services they perform for an employer.”).  
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(4)(A) (excluding unpaid public agency volunteers from the FLSA’s 
definition of “employee”); FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“The FLSA makes a special excep-
tion . . . for individuals who volunteer to perform services for a state or local government 
agency . . . [and] for individuals who volunteer their time . . . for charitable, civic, or humanitarian 
purposes to non-profit organizations.”). 
52 This conclusion follows directly from the notes following the test that state, “If all of the 
factors listed above are met, an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA, and the 
Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply to the intern.” FACT SHEET, supra 
note 33 (emphasis added). Interestingly, however, Judge Pauley diverged from this particular 
aspect of the Fact Sheet and instead opted for a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Glatt, 2013 
WL 2495140, at *14. 
53 FACT SHEET, supra note 33. 
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In addition to the test, the Fact Sheet expounds on some of the criteria in 
supplemental paragraphs. For instance, the first paragraph explains the part 
of the test that deals with the internship’s educational aspect. It reads as 
follows: 
In general, the more an internship program is structured around a classroom or 
academic experience as opposed to the employer’s actual operations, the more 
likely the internship will be viewed as an extension of the individual’s educa-
tional experience (this often occurs where a college or university exercises oversight 
over the internship program and provides educational credit). 54 
C. Flaws of the Fact Sheet 
Despite addressing the growing criticism about unpaid internships, the 
Fact Sheet still requires improvement because (1) the informative paragraph’s 
language about the legality of unpaid internships where the intern receives 
college credit is misleading and unsupported by evidence, (2) the conjunc-
tive test is unnecessarily complex because the first, third, and fifth prongs 
are just derivatives of the second and fourth prongs, and (3) the fourth 
prong’s immediacy requirement ignores the substantial long-term and 
delayed-realization benefits that unpaid interns confer on employers. 
First, judges or employers may be misled by the Fact Sheet’s discussion 
of college oversight. The Fact Sheet states that internships in which the intern 
receives educational credit are more likely to be viewed as a permissible 
“extension of the individual’s educational experience,” further noting that 
“this often occurs where a college or university exercises oversight over the 
internship program and provides educational credit.”55 This language 
implies that a significant number of internships for college credit are legal. 
Thus, because of this paragraph, an employer—or judge—may believe that 
an intern’s receipt of school credit is sufficient to render an unpaid internship 
legal, and therefore, the employer can derive a benefit from that intern. 
This assumption, however, is incorrect. The fourth prong of the test 
mandates that the employer receive “no immediate advantage” from the 
intern, regardless of whether that intern is having an educational experience. 56 
Further, “educational environment” and school credits are distinct concepts. A 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that, since the Department of Labor does not 
track information on unpaid internships, the word “often” is not supported by the Department of 
Labor’s available data. Steinberg, supra note 41, at 2 (noting that the Department of Labor keeps 
no record of unpaid internships). 
56 FACT SHEET, supra note 33. 
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student can receive credits from her college but nevertheless work in an 
environment that is far from educational. For instance, her school may give 
her three credits to intern for a newspaper, but her work may consist solely 
of running personal errands for the editor. 
Second, on a more general level, this test is overly complicated because each 
prong—other than the second and the fourth—is really just supplemental to 
the broader question of whether the relationship entails mutual benefits. 
The first prong pertaining to education, for example, cannot be a sufficient 
test in itself; it can instead only be an indicator of whether the relationship 
primarily benefits the employer or the intern (which is the issue in the 
second and fourth prongs). If the workplace environment resembles a 
classroom setting, this is evidence that the employer is helping the intern 
without benefitting himself. Similarly, with respect to the third prong 
regarding displacement, if the intern displaces regular workers, this fact 
would be evidence that the intern is conferring a benefit upon the employer 
by cutting his labor costs. And finally, if the intern is hired for a trial period 
with the expectation that the employer will later hire her on a permanent 
basis (per the fifth prong), this fact would support the conclusion that the 
employer was trying to get a free ride on the training portion of the em-
ployment relationship. 
Third, the Fact Sheet’s final flaw is the use of the word “immediate” in 
the fourth prong.57 This adjective is problematic because it permits unpaid 
internships where the intern, though he may not provide an immediate 
advantage to the employer, nevertheless confers a long-term advantage on 
the employer. Examples of such long-term advantages include improving an 
employer’s goodwill with clients, the community, and universities, and 
providing industry-wide, cost-free training.  
Under the current Fact Sheet, employers are able to derive these long-
term benefits, while the interns remain unpaid and still have no basic 
protections against harassment or discrimination. There should not be a 
distinction between immediate and future advantage. In both cases, unpaid 
interns are increasing employers’ bottom lines. 
To understand how these long-term advantages may occur, consider a 
hypothetical. Suppose an employer, ABC Investments, is located in a central 
New Jersey suburb and hires ten unpaid interns each summer. Of these ten 
interns, eight are sophomores from Princeton University, and the other two 
are children of wealthy clients. This hiring practice generates long-term 
advantages for ABC. 
 
57 See id. (“The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from 
the activities of the intern.”). 
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First, ABC generates goodwill with universities by hiring sophomores 
from one of the most prestigious universities in the United States. This 
relationship will promote the ABC brand among graduating students 
applying for full-time jobs, enabling ABC to attract some of the nation’s top 
talent. Second, ABC generates goodwill with the community by hiring 
students from a nearby school. People in the community will presumably 
hear about this practice, feel a stronger connection to ABC, and be more 
prone to seek the firm’s services. Third, ABC generates goodwill with 
wealthy clients by hiring their children to fill the remaining spots. ABC has 
thereby increased the loyalty of these clients, assuring that they will remain 
with ABC or even increase their business with the firm. 
Furthermore, if these low-cost unpaid internships are prevalent in the 
industry, ABC and firms like it may avoid training costs. For example, even 
if ABC does not directly guarantee each of its interns a full-time job after 
the internship (which would make the firm compliant with the fifth prong 
of the Fact Sheet’s test), ABC will most likely hire employees with similar 
internship experience. Likewise, similar firms may hire some of ABC’s 
previous interns.58 Hence, rather than have to hire a new employee and 
train her for, say, $2000, firms in the industry can hire previous interns who 
have already been trained for free. Thus, all such unpaid interns are working 
for the industry as a whole and thereby each firm within it. 
D. Negative Effects of Unpaid Internships 
The adverse consequences of unpaid internships include financial detriment 
to interns, discriminatory benefits among different socioeconomic classes, 
an increase in the unemployment rate, and a lack of workplace harassment 
statutes protecting interns. 
1. Financial Detriment to the Intern 
Though the harm to an intern’s finances from an unpaid internship may 
be obvious, consider the following real-world example. 
Felicia Melvin was a communications student at Cabrini College, near 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.59 When she landed an unpaid internship with 
 
58 See Joseph E. Aoun, Protect Unpaid Internships, INSIDE HIGHER ED ( July 13, 2010), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/07/13/aoun (“[Seventy-five] percent of employers 
prefer job candidates with relevant work experience[ and m]ore than 90 percent prefer to hire 
interns or co-ops who have worked for their organization.”). 
59 Emma Jacobs, Do Unpaid Internships Make Sense for Students?, NEWSWORKS ( July 6, 2012), 
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local//business-a-economy/41042-do-unpaid-internships-make-
sense-for-students. 
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CBS in New York City, she was happy to work for such a well-respected 
company.60 Felicia avoided the prohibitive costs of renting an apartment in 
New York City by remaining in Philadelphia, and instead woke up at five 
o’clock in the morning to take the bus every day.61 In the office, “she worked 
in the creative services department, mostly putting together promos.”62  
The main expenses Felicia incurred were transportation and opportunity 
costs. First, with respect to transportation, she spent $34 each way for her 
bus ticket.63 Assuming she worked three times a week for a ten-week 
summer, her bus tickets would total $2040 (not including parking at the bus 
station, gas to drive to and from the bus station, and subway fare between 
the station and CBS).  
Felicia also incurred significant opportunity costs. Rather than receive 
no income, she could have earned $12 per hour as a waitress.64 If she had 
waitressed eight hours per day, three days per week during this same ten-
week timeframe, she would have earned $2880 and netted this sum less 
driving costs. In taking the CBS internship, then, Felicia realistically lost 
almost $5000.65  
This scenario, however, becomes more complicated when Felicia does 
not have the $2040 for Greyhound bus tickets. In this hypothetical, Felicia 
must actually get a second job to pay for her unpaid internship. This 
situation may not be uncommon, at least at Cabrini College, where the 
career services counselor states, “Our students are working sometimes two 
and three jobs . . . [because] in order to do a co-op or internship, they need 
income.”66 If we take a second look at the opportunity costs of Felicia’s 
internship—assuming she does not have the capital for traveling to and 
from New York City—we find that her costs are actually greater than just 
revenue from waitressing less transportation costs. In fact, because she must 
now have a side job to pay for the CBS internship, the opportunity costs 
also include the benefit she could have gained from doing productive 
activities during the time she now spends at that job. More simply, in the 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Estimating Felicia’s exact expenses is complicated because she completed her internship a year 
ago, and transportation costs fluctuate. The current price is $34 for a one-way ticket on a Greyhound 
bus. See Philadelphia: Traveling from Philly to NYC, TRIP ADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com/Travel-
g60795-c3501/Philadelphia:Pennsylvania:Traveling.From.Philly.To.Nyc.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
64  For simplicity, I make the assumption that Felicia could actually get a job as a waitress at 
$12 per hour. 
65 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“Even with the recession, students are willing to dish out 
hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars to cover expenses for internships far from home.”). 
66 Jacobs, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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scenario where she works only as a waitress, she works twenty-four hours 
per week. But in the scenario where each week she works twenty-four hours 
each with CBS and as a waitress, she has twenty-four fewer hours in her week 
that could be spent on her studies or on recreational activities. 
One could, of course, view Felicia as an extreme example because most 
interns do not travel from Philadelphia to New York City every day. 
Though even in less extreme cases, the interns incur transportation costs 
and similar opportunity costs. Additionally, some interns, unlike Felicia, 
may choose to live in the city of their internship, which means that the costs 
of the internship include transportation, living, and opportunity costs—a 
sum presumably even greater than Felicia’s. 
2. Unfair Advantage to Wealthier Students 
Another effect of unpaid internships is that they favor wealthy students 
at the expense of economically disadvantaged ones because (1) student debt 
is not uniform and (2) some students have parents or other third parties 
who will pay for the costs of the internship.67  
Regarding the first point, the average student-loan debt of borrowers in 
the undergraduate class of 2011 was $26,500, a 5% increase from the previous 
year.68 In addition, almost two-thirds of students with a bachelor’s degrees 
graduate with debt—some with significantly higher debt than the average.69 
Furthermore, the interest rate for Stafford Loans is currently 3.86% for 
undergraduates and 5.41% for graduate students,70 and student loans are 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.71  
It also follows, however, that one-third of students have no debt at all. 
Due to this disparity, students with debt have an incentive to get paying jobs 
as opposed to unpaid internships, because they seek to pay off their loans as 
soon as possible to realize the full value of their eventual salaries. Likewise, 
they have a disincentive to take unpaid internships because such uncompen-
sated positions do nothing to reduce the size of their nondischargeable 
student loan debt.  
 
67 See Brann & Isaacson, supra note 42 (“The Obama administration has expressed concerns 
about unpaid internships, commenting that the practice may be abusive and unfair because less-
affluent students can’t afford to spend a summer working as an unpaid intern.”). 
68 Tamar Lewin, Student-Loan Borrowers Average $26,500 in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, 
at A22. 
69 INST. FOR COLLEGE ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT AND THE 
CLASS OF 2011 (2012), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2011.pdf. 
70 Stafford Loan Interest Rates, STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/stafford-
loan-info/interest-rates.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
71 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
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Regarding the second point, some students’ families can subsidize their 
cost of living during an internship or even pay for consultants to help them 
obtain one.72 If we turn back to Felicia’s situation, and this time assume she 
has a wealthy family, she would not have to worry about taking, let alone 
paying for, a Greyhound bus because her parents would pay for her apart-
ment in NYC, her meals, and her subway fare. As a result, the cost–benefit 
analysis of whether to take the position at CBS or to work as a waitress would 
weigh heavily in favor of CBS because of the position’s long-term benefits.  
The eventual consequence of these disparities in loan debt and parent 
subsidization is that wealthier students have a greater ability to take unpaid 
internships. Accordingly, they have a competitive advantage in their respec-
tive industries from better work experience and connections over students 
who took paid positions at local golf courses or restaurants.73 Thus, the 
unpaid internship, though meant as a means of education, in fact becomes a 
mechanism for impeding intergenerational class mobility.  
Moreover, from an economic standpoint, this feature of unpaid intern-
ships is unsettling because it means that the U.S. labor market rewards those 
from privileged upbringings, as opposed to those with merit, which renders 
our labor pool less competitive and efficient.74 This inefficiency could result 
in higher prices to consumers and disadvantage U.S. companies relative to 
their foreign competitors. 
3. Increase in Unemployment Rate 
Another effect of unpaid internships is that they will eventually increase 
the unemployment rate. To cut costs, employers will hire unpaid interns and 
thereby displace paid employees, who will then add to the number of 
unemployed workers in the labor force.75 Rising costs of healthcare and 
other employee benefits will only exacerbate this tendency, because they 
make hiring a paid employee even more expensive, increasing the incentive 
 
72 See Sue Shellenbarger, Do You Want an Internship? It’ll Cost You, WALL ST. J. ( J an. 28, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123310699999022549.html (noting that some parents pay 
$5000 to $9500 for internship consultants to help their children find internships). 
73 See Greenhouse, supra note 9 (“[C]ollege graduates with wealthy parents who can underwrite 
their living costs during their internships get a leg up because they get a head start with coveted 
employers . . . . But college grads whose parents cannot support them say they often have to turn to 
an $8.50-an-hour job at McDonald’s or Target and cannot afford to take an unpaid internship.”). 
74 See Pologeorgis, supra note 38 (stating that unpaid internships hurt the labor market “by 
undermining the job allocation based on meritocracy which rewards people for their skills rather 
[than] their socioeconomic background”). 
75 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4. 
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to hire unpaid interns.76 Furthermore, employers have ready access to these 
interns, especially in economic downturns, because students want relevant 
professional experience to give them an advantage in their post-graduation 
job hunt.77 This large supply makes finding unpaid interns easy and provides 
employers a constant flow of free labor. This flow then permanently displaces 
the full-time employee(s) who would otherwise be doing that work. 78 
Real world examples support this point. A freshman from Connecticut 
worked as an unpaid intern at a university close to his home.79 There, his 
supervisor gave the interns a stack of files, which they then input into a 
computer database. “We were doing a lot of the work that people there were 
getting paid to do,” the young man says.80 “Basically, we just got thrown in. 
A couple of people had been fired, and we had to do their jobs.”81 
Alex Footman’s story also corroborates this trend. While working on 
Black Swan, he and the other unpaid interns filled coffee pots, took out the 
trash, got lunch for the staff, and cleaned the office.82 Rather than pay 
assistants to get lunch and coffee or janitors to take out the trash and clean 
the office, the studio exploited these Hollywood-hopefuls’ need for experi-
ence by replacing paid employees with unpaid interns. When situations like 
these are aggregated, the result is that more people are working for free and 
fewer people are working for money.83 
4. Lack of Protection Against Discrimination and Harassment 
A final negative consequence of unpaid internships is that they do not 
afford interns the same legal rights as employees.84 For example, unpaid 
 
76 See id. 
77 See Pologeorgis, supra note 38 (stating that high unemployment causes students to “flock to 
unpaid internships in hopes of transitioning to a full-time paid job” or to gain experience to make 
themselves more desirable candidates in a crowded labor market). 
78 See id. (“[I]nternships are supposed to be recruiting pipelines . . . . Instead they are being 
used as a way to free labor where employers . . . cycl[e] through interns without any intent to hire 
them on a full-time basis.”).  
79 Fulham, supra note 40. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Greenhouse, supra note 1. 
83 There has been no convincing hard research to correlate unemployment and unpaid in-
ternships. The link, however, seems intuitive based on a basic grasp of supply and demand. I also 
concede that there may be positive economic arguments for unpaid internships—for instance, that 
they decrease costs to consumers by decreasing labor costs. But this argument is one that could be 
made for eliminating minimum wage laws in general. The economics of unpaid internships, 
however, is outside the scope of this Comment. 
84 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 1 (“[A] lack of clear regulation . . . leaves 
many interns unprotected by workplace discrimination and harassment statutes . . . .”). 
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interns are not protected by workplace and discrimination statutes such as 
the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.85 More specifically, unpaid interns are 
not considered “employees” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 
due to their unpaid status.86 This lack of protection leaves interns particularly 
vulnerable to harassment, because they are “generally on the lowest rung of 
a workplace hierarchy.”87  
For instance, Bridget O’Connor was an unpaid intern at “Rockland, a 
hospital for the mentally disabled.”88 There, her supervisor continually 
abused her by repeatedly calling O’Connor “Miss Sexual Harassment,” 
suggesting that they have an “orgy” with other women, and telling 
O’Connor to remove her clothes before a meeting.89 O’Connor’s eventual 
lawsuit, however, was dismissed because her unpaid status meant she was 
not an employee.90  
O’Connor’s story shows that unpaid interns, hoping to have beneficial 
learning experiences with employers that will make them attractive candi-
dates for paid positions, are sometimes subject to harassment and discrimi-
nation, yet have no recourse in the judicial system.  
E. Why Unpaid Internships Persist  
Even under the Fact Sheet’s murky six-prong standard, it is clear that 
some unpaid internships are outright illegal.91 Marra Green’s internship,92 
for example, which involved Christmas shopping and returning clothes for 
her boss, violates the Fact Sheet’s test for three reasons. First, Marra’s tasks 
immediately benefitted her boss. Second, her experience taught her nothing 
about the fashion industry. And third, her internship did not resemble an 
educational environment.93 Nevertheless, internships like Marra’s continue 
to exist throughout the country because of the unequal bargaining power 
 
85 Id. 
86 See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Where no financial benefit is 
obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no ‘plausible’ employment relationship of 
any sort can be said to exist because . . . [compensation] is an essential condition to the existence 
of an employer–employee relationship.”). 
87 Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 3. 
88 O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 113. 
89 Id. at 113-14. 
90 Id. at 115-16. 
91 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (“[M]any employers failed to pay even though their intern-
ships did not comply with the six federal legal criteria that must be satisfied for internships to be 
unpaid.”); see also supra Section I.C. 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. 
93 For the full six-prong test, see supra text accompanying note 49. 
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between the intern and the employer and inadequate oversight by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
One reason for the unequal bargaining power is that the recession has 
hit young college graduates hard. Indeed, the unemployment rate for 
college graduates in 2011 was 8.8%, and this number does not even take into 
account students who chose to attend graduate school but preferred to be 
working.94 Moreover, of the young graduates who were employed in 2011, 
37.8% had jobs that did not require a college degree, which depressed their 
wages.95 These statistics are particularly problematic in light of the more than 
$26,000 in loan debt the average 2011 graduate carried.96 The ultimate result of 
this weak labor market and high debt load is that young Americans will do 
whatever they can to get ahead—even work for free.97 
It is no secret that employers prefer candidates with prior experience.98 
A 2010 job outlook survey reported that “75 percent of employers prefer 
candidates with relevant work experience[, and m]ore than 90 percent 
prefer to hire interns or co-ops who have worked for their organization.”99 
Another study found that “[a]pproximately 42 percent of graduates with 
internships who applied for a job received an offer compared with only 30 
percent for students who had no internship experience.”100 As a corollary, 
interns do not have the power to request the minimum wage because, if they 
do, their employer will just hire someone else for free.101  
 
94 Mark Memmott, Tough Times, Even Higher Debts for College Graduates, NPR (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/10/18/163137239/tough-times-even-higher-debts-for-college-
graduates. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 See Jacobs, supra note 59 (“For many college students and recent graduates, one of the most 
attractive paths into the workforce has become an internship, often unpaid.”). 
98 See Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for the Un-
paid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2617 (1998) (noting that a catch-22 exists in the job 
market where “[e]mployers tend to hire only experienced personnel, but college graduates possess 
little applicable experience”). But see Jordan Weissmann, Do Unpaid Internships Lead to Jobs? Not for 
College Students, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/ 
06/do-unpaid-internships-lead-to-jobs-not-for-college-students/276959 (noting that, according to a 
recent survey of students who received at least one job offer, only 1.8% more had previously held 
an unpaid internship than those who had never held an internship). 
99 Aoun, supra note 58.  
100 NAT'L ASS'N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS. (NACE), NACE RESEARCH BRIEF: 2010 STU-
DENT SURVEY 4 (2010), available at http://www.naceweb.org/research/student_survey_brief. 
101 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“‘It’s frustrating,’ [one student] says. ‘I know they’re not 
going to pay me because I know there’s always somebody who would take this instead of me.’”). 
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Another explanation for the continuance of unpaid internships is that 
there is little oversight.102 In the Labor Department, investigations are 
“complaint-driven.”103 The problem with this is that interns have an incentive 
to keep their unpaid internships and thus a disincentive to report abuses. 
They believe these internships will increase their chances of getting a paid 
full-time job. But at the same time, they worry about the personal repercus-
sions for being a whistleblower. They fear that if they alert the Labor 
Department or personally file a lawsuit, their reputation in the industry will be 
sullied, or their employers will fire them or withhold a recommendation.104 
Furthermore, because so many students want unpaid internships, potential 
whistleblowers may feel like any action taken would be futile since other people, 
willing to put up with the illegal violations, would readily take their place.105 
II. MY PROPOSAL 
To clarify and simplify the Fact Sheet, I propose that judges borrow the 
contract law doctrine of consideration to determine whether an intern is in 
fact an employee or a volunteer. Specifically, judges should ask whether the 
employer offered the unpaid internship to receive a benefit from the 
intern.106 If such a bilateral exchange of consideration occurred, a valid 
contract was formed, and the relationship was one of employer–employee. 
If, on the other hand, the employer offered a gratuitous promise (e.g., “I’ll 
give you work, and I don’t expect to benefit from it myself ”), the relation-
ship is one of employer–unpaid intern. 
I do not propose, however, that the current six-prong test be discarded 
altogether. Instead, I recommend that the first, third, and fifth prongs107 be 
 
102 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (“Many regulators say that violations are widespread, but 
that it is unusually hard to mount a major enforcement effort because interns are often afraid to 
file complaints.”). 
103 See Jacobs, supra note 59 (stating that “investigations remain complaint-driven” and that 
“[t]he Labor Department . . . still does not track intern cases”). 
104 See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (“Unpaid interns are usually too scared to speak out and to 
bring such a lawsuit because they are frightened it will hurt their chances of finding future jobs in 
their industry.”); Jacobs, supra note 59 (“Melvin[, an unpaid intern,] did think sometimes she 
should get paid, but wanted a recommendation and she felt intimidated.”). 
105 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 2 (“The crucial role of internships in 
obtaining later employment and the highly competitive market for placement means that no one 
student has an incentive to report their employer, even in cases of blatant abuses, since another 
student will readily work for free.”). 
106 That the intern is expecting to receive a benefit from the employer—most likely an intan-
gible benefit such as experience, connections, or credentials—is presumed.  
107 As a reminder, the first prong is, “The internship . . . is similar to training which would 
be given in an educational environment;” the third prong is, “The intern does not displace regular 
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converted into nondispositive factors that will help the trier of fact deter-
mine whether there were mutually induced promises.108 Because these 
factors are ways of determining whether the relationship comprises mutual 
benefits,109 removing them will create a simpler, more condensed test for 
judges. I incorporate the second and fourth prongs110 into my overarching test 
to show that a benefit to the intern or the employer is a way of demonstrating 
a bilateral exchange of consideration. Finally, the sixth prong111 should not 
be treated as a factor, but instead as a threshold question. If the employer 
and the intern did not understand that the intern was to work for free, then no 
additional analysis is necessary, because there was never a meeting of the minds.  
In summary, I propose the following steps to test for the legality of 
unpaid internships: 
1. Did both parties understand that the internship would be unpaid?112  
2. Did the employer offer the position to receive a benefit113 from the 
intern? The emphasis here is ex ante. The question is whether the 
employer sought to receive a benefit from the intern, not whether a benefit 
was actually conferred.114 
 
employees, but works under close supervision of existing staff;” and the fifth prong is, “The intern is 
not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship.” FACT SHEET, supra note 33. 
108 By “mutually induced promises,” I mean two promises that are caused by each other. For 
example, A promises to pay B in exchange for B painting A’s house. A’s promise to pay B is caused 
by B’s promise to paint his house, and vice versa. 
109 By “mutual benefits,” I mean a situation in which both parties accrue advantages that 
would not have occurred had the employment relationship not existed. 
110 The second prong is, “The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern,” and the 
fourth prong is, “The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from 
the activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded.” FACT 
SHEET, supra note 33. 
111 The sixth prong is, “The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not enti-
tled to wages for the time spent in the internship.” Id. 
112 The employer and the intern both must have understood that the intern would not be 
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship. 
113 Note that, contrary to the Fact Sheet, I do not use the adjective “immediate.” 
114 There will be evidentiary problems in discovering the employer’s ex ante intent. Such 
problems, however, also beset the factfinder in any criminal or civil trial that requires a finding of 
intent. Factors helpful in making this determination include (1) whether the internship was similar 
to training given in a classroom, (2) whether the intern displaced regular employees, (3) whether 
the employer promised the intern a job at the conclusion of the internship, and (4) whether the 
employer did, ex post, receive a benefit—though none of these is dispositive. The burden of proof 
is on the defendant to show that the exchange of consideration was actually unilateral on his part. 
Putting the burden of proof on the defendant is consistent with my earlier interpretation of the 
Fact Sheet. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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3. Did the agreement entail a bilateral exchange of consideration? If it did, 
a valid employment contract was formed and the intern is, in fact, an 
“employee” deserving at least a minimum wage, an overtime rate, and 
protections against discrimination and harassment.115 If the agreement 
did not entail a bilateral exchange of consideration, then it is instead a 
gratuitous promise, and the intern is a “trainee” entitled to no wages.116 
III. APPLICATION OF MY PROPOSAL 
In this Part, I apply my proposal to hypothetical unpaid internships. 
A. Situation 1: Blatant Illegality 
Molly is a student at a premier fashion institute, and she just had a con-
versation with Sophia, the president of XYZ Fashion Company (XYZ). 
Sophia told Molly that she could work for her over the summer for forty 
hours each week. Sophia would not pay Molly, but Molly would be able to 
learn about the fashion industry and would have a great name to put on her 
resume. Molly agrees, but over the summer, she is disappointed by her 
work. Molly checks Sophia’s mail, makes coffee for the office, takes lunch 
orders, cold-calls department stores to ask if they will carry XYZ’s products, 
and sweeps the floors at the end of every day. In fact, during two particularly 
busy weeks, Molly works ten hours each day. At the end of her internship, 
she files a lawsuit against XYZ. 
 
115 Note that, under my test, even if an intern did not receive wages, she could still be enti-
tled to sexual harassment protection. This logic is in contrast to the logic employed by the court in 
O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1997). There, the court held that, because the intern 
was unpaid, she was not protected under sexual harassment statutes. Id. at 119. I argue that, in 
cases like this, if the internship fails my test, the plaintiff could sue not only for back pay, but also 
for violations of harassment statutes because she should have been paid wages. That she was 
wrongfully not paid should not ruin her sexual harassment claim. 
116 I avoid the question here of whether legally unpaid interns should be protected against 
workplace sexual harassment. In the Second Circuit, they are not protected. See supra subsection 
I.C.4. However, both legislative chambers in Oregon recently passed a law protecting all unpaid 
interns from harassment and discrimination. See Kristian Foden-Vencil, Oregon Bill to Protect Unpaid 
Interns from Harassment, Discrimination, OPB (June 5, 2013), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-
bill-to-protect-unpaid-interns-from-harassment-discrimination; see also Ortner, supra note 98, at 2645 
(arguing that unpaid interns should receive protections under Title VII because they are “employ-
ees” since they receive nonmonetary compensation). This topic, while relevant, is beyond the 
scope of this Comment.  
I concur with Ortner and believe that if there is a bilateral exchange of consideration, there is 
a valid employment contract and the intern is an “employee.” Therefore, as an employee, the 
intern deserves the protection of harassment and discrimination laws, even if judges refuse to 
mandate that such employment contracts warrant monetary consideration.  
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This example is the most clear cut. Put simply, Molly will win her civil 
suit. Nevertheless, I apply my test step by step. 
First, we must ask, “Did Molly and Sophia understand that Molly was 
to work for free?” Yes, both the employer and Molly understood this fact in 
their preliminary conversation. 
Second, we must ask, “Did Sophia offer the internship to Molly to receive 
a benefit from the internship?” Factors helpful in making this determination 
are (1) whether the internship was similar to training given in a classroom, (2) 
whether the intern displaced regular employees, and (3) whether the employ-
er promised the intern a job at the conclusion of the internship. Yes, the 
benefit to Sophia here is very clear. A work environment that entails making 
coffee, taking lunch orders, and sweeping floors is nothing like the classroom 
environment of Molly’s premier fashion institute, where the professors speak 
about how to create clothes and jewelry that match seasonal trends and 
satisfy consumers. Additionally, it seems obvious that Molly is doing the 
work of a janitor and a secretary and is thereby displacing a paid worker 
who could be, or perhaps was, employed by Sophia. No employment was 
promised to Molly, but this fact alone is not enough to overcome the 
overwhelming evidence that Sophia hired Molly to receive Molly’s work 
product without paying her in return.  
Under my test, Molly is entitled to at least the minimum wage of $7.25 
for every hour she worked up to forty hours a week and then $10.88 for the 
forty-first to fiftieth hours she worked in the two particularly busy weeks.117 
If Sophia or another employee had harassed or discriminated against Molly, 
she would also have standing to bring a harassment or discrimination suit. 
B. Situation 2: Latent Illegality 
Molly, Sophia, and XYZ are the characters again, and Sophia and Molly 
have the same conversation in which they agree that Molly is not to be paid. 
This time, however, they stipulate that Molly will not be sweeping floors or 
answering phones. Instead of hiring a paid consultant for XYZ’s busy 
summer, Sophia has hired Molly as an intern to do substantive, challenging 
work. During her time, Molly works with a team of eight people in the “Fall 
Trends” department, and Molly is treated just like every other employee. 
She comes up with new designs for necklaces and earrings (her specialties) 
and helps conceive marketing plans for XYZ’s fall catalogue. Molly’s hours 
are the same as in the previous example. 
 
117 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
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Here, our intuition changes from the previous example, and we feel more 
comfortable with the internship—most likely because Molly is receiving 
increased intangible consideration in the form of experience.118 The outcome, 
however, is the same as in the previous example: the internship is illegal. 
As a threshold matter, Molly and Sophia both understand that the intern-
ship is unpaid. So again, the core issue is whether there was mutually 
induced consideration.119 To test this, we ask whether Sophia expected to 
receive a benefit from Molly. Molly’s expectation of a benefit is presumed. 
Recall, the focus is on the parties’ ex ante expectations.  
In this scenario, Sophia seems to have offered Molly the internship to 
receive a benefit from her. Rather than hire a creative consultant for the 
summer, whom Sophia would have to pay, she hired Molly for free, expecting 
Molly to confer a benefit upon the company through her creativity and 
work product. Contractually, Sophia’s promise to provide Molly experience 
induced Molly’s promise to provide product ideas and marketing schemes to 
Sophia—and vice versa.120 Thus, because we have a bilateral exchange of 
mutually induced consideration, we have a valid employment contract that 
deserves at least the minimum wage and that gives Molly standing to file a 
harassment or discrimination lawsuit.  
C. Situation 3: Superficially Unsettling Illegality 
The preliminary agreement is the same as that of the previous example 
(no pay), and the kind of work Molly does is also the same. What changes in 
this situation, however, is Molly’s work product. Her jewelry and necklace 
designs are hideous, her loud singing in the office is a constant distraction, 
and her rudeness offends the customers who enter the premises. In fact, 
Sophia tells her to leave two weeks before the conclusion of the summer. 
In this situation, intuition tempts us to believe that Molly deserves no 
compensation because Sophia has been harmed by Molly’s internship, yet 
Molly can still benefit from the relationship by putting the prestigious XYZ 
name on her resume. Here, however, our intuition leads us astray. 
 
118 Note, though, that some people may be even more uncomfortable with this scenario than 
the previous one because Sophia is receiving more valuable work from Molly. Nevertheless, 
intuition is not the focus of this Comment. 
119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981) (“A performance or return 
promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by 
the promisee in exchange for that promise.”). 
120 Even though Molly received increased intangible consideration, nonmonetary compensa-
tion does not satisfy the minimum wage laws of the United States. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006 
& Supp. V 2012) (requiring wages of $7.25 per hour or more). 
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Again, the first step is not a problem because both Molly and Sophia 
understood the internship was unpaid. As for the second step, however, a 
careful look at the language is necessary. The key inquiry is whether the 
employer offered the unpaid internship to receive a benefit from the intern. 
The emphasis is not on whether actual benefit was conferred upon the 
employer, but instead on whether the employer, ex ante, sought a benefit. 
Situations 2 and 3 demonstrate why this emphasis is proper. 
Any employer, in making a hiring decision, is taking a risk. Ex post, an 
employee might have benefitted the firm or hurt it. Regardless, the employee—
in this case, the intern—deserves at least a minimum wage because this risk 
is properly placed on the employer since it is the employer who stands to 
benefit from such hiring decisions. For instance, let us presume that Sophia 
will hire one hundred people over the next five years, and that she makes 
her decisions after a two-round interview process. These five years show 
that ninety of the employees each conferred a net benefit of $1000 to XYZ, 
but ten of the employees each caused a net loss to the firm of $1000. There-
fore, in total, Sophia’s hiring practice benefitted her firm by $80,000. 
In fact, Sophia rationally undertook those ten bad eggs and their resulting 
$10,000 cost to XYZ. For example, suppose that Sophia could have 100% 
accuracy in hiring competent individuals, but that this accuracy would entail 
a four-round interview process that would cost her an additional $25,000. 
Therefore, if she chose this four-round interview process, she would have 
one hundred persons, each providing a $1000 benefit to XYZ, but because of 
the high costs of achieving 100% accuracy, the net benefit would be only 
$75,000—$5000 lower than the alternative scenario in which she had chosen 
ninety competent persons and ten incompetent persons. 
Thus, Sophia should be required to pay for Molly’s internship, even 
though Molly’s work was unproductive, because Sophia consciously and 
rationally undertook that risk. In fact, Sophia benefits from the reward of 
that risk over the course of time.121 To hold contrarily would be to allow 
Sophia to freeride on her choice of interns until they proved themselves worthy. 
 
121 This logic is similar, though not identical, to Marvin Chirelstein’s analysis of mutual 
mistakes, where he states that  
the dealer calculates that he will lose $X through misappraisals unless he spends $X 
plus $Y to hire another appraiser. Since the cost of employing additional personnel 
exceeds the expected benefit, the dealer wisely decides not to take that step. But having 
made that decision, he cannot also claim that he has made a ‘mistake’ and should be 
permitted to rescind . . . . 
MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 169 
(6th ed. 2010). 
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Now, a complication to this scenario is that the Fact Sheet uses the language 
“immediate advantage.”122 One could arguably construe this situation as not 
providing Sophia with an “immediate” advantage; Sophia would only 
benefit in the long run from her hiring scheme. I, however, eliminated the 
“immediate” language from my test because it could conceivably prevent 
employers from having to pay interns in situations such as these and bring 
about other complications that I will discuss later.123  
In conclusion, Molly would be entitled to the same damages as before 
(minus the two weeks she did not work due to her dismissal) and would 
have standing to bring harassment and discrimination lawsuits. 
D. Situation 4: Simple Legality 
Here, we have a similar preliminary agreement in which Molly and Sophia 
understand that Molly is not to be paid and not promised a full-time job. 
This time, the internship proceeds differently, and Molly shadows Sophia 
throughout the day. Molly sees how Sophia talks to clients, why she chooses 
to market jeans A over jeans B, how she deals with her employees, and 
generally how the fashion industry works. In fact, during the summer, 
Sophia stays late some days telling Molly about how she got started in the 
industry and Molly often interrupts Sophia’s work with her questions. On 
the last day, Molly gives Sophia her consummative project: a new necklace 
design, but Sophia does not, and never intended to, include it in her 
catalogue and only gives Molly constructive criticism on it. 
Applying my proposal, we find that this unpaid internship is legal.124 Ex 
ante, Sophia expected no benefit from Molly; indeed, Sophia did not even 
anticipate receiving a work product from Molly. Molly’s capstone project, 
while relevant to XYZ, was really just a training exercise. Indeed, Sophia 
was even hurt by hiring Molly, because Molly’s questions interrupted her 
workflow and because Sophia spent time talking to Molly that she could 
otherwise have spent working. Molly, on the other hand, received a great 
benefit because she can put XYZ on her resume and she has learned how to 
be successful in the fashion industry from an expert. 
Another crucial point here is that Sophia did not promise Molly a full-
time job at the conclusion of the internship. If she had, one could make the 
 
122 See FACT SHEET, supra note 33.  
123 For a more detailed discussion regarding my omission of “immediate,” see supra sub-
section II.A.2. 
124 To avoid redundancy, we presume hereafter that both parties understand the internship is 
to be unpaid. 
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argument that Molly should be considered an employee because Sophia 
expected to receive a benefit from the internship: a cost-free training period.  
E. Situation 5: Unexpected Benefit 
This situation has the same premise as the previous one except that, one 
day, while Sophia is showing Molly the new fall catalogue, Molly suggests 
making the primary dress orange instead of purple. Sophia likes the idea 
and, at the last minute, changes the color of XYZ’s main dress of the season 
to orange. The dress flies off the shelves, and XYZ, as a result, sees a 10% 
increase in revenue. 
Though this scenario is complicated, if we adhere to the test, the out-
come is clear. First, we ask whether Sophia offered the position to Molly to 
receive a benefit from the internship. The answer is that, ex ante, Sophia 
merely intended for Molly to be her shadow and, indeed, expected Molly to 
sometimes hinder her work—as occurred in Scenario 4. Ultimately, howev-
er, Molly conferred an unexpected benefit upon Sophia.  
Our analysis, though, must remain rigid and focused on the ex ante inten-
tions. Actual benefits can be evidence of the employer’s ex ante intentions, 
but they are not dispositive. If we look at the facts of the situation, it is clear 
that Sophia initially offered Molly the internship and the experience that 
came with it with no expectation of reciprocal benefits—in essence, it was a 
gift. What demonstrates this intention is that Sophia required Molly to 
shadow her throughout the summer.  
Molly, for her part, conferred her benefit upon Sophia unexpectedly; 
Sophia never bargained for it. Indeed, the color idea can be construed as an 
unexpected gift from Molly’s standpoint, so the entire situation is best 
thought of as the exchange of two unconnected gifts—in contractual 
language, as gratuitous promises that were not mutually induced. The 
scenario of the unexpected benefit, therefore, passes my test, and the unpaid 
internship is legal. 
F. Situation 6: Conditional Gratuitous Promise 
Our final situation is a complicated one, and to illustrate it properly, we 
need new characters. Now, we have Gary, an owner of a construction 
company, and Fred, a young man hoping to be a carpenter. In a conversation, 
Gary tells Fred, “I’ll show you the ropes of being a carpenter, but I think 
that, to really learn the trade, you have to do real work. To help you out, I’ll 
give you some very small projects on my construction sites, and I’ll watch 
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over you to make sure you do them correctly, even though it will mean less 
time for me to watch over my other guys.” 
Applying our test here is complex and requires close attention to the 
precise language. Again, the second step is to examine whether the employer 
offered the position to receive a benefit from the internship. The vital word, 
in this situation, is “to” because it goes to the employer’s motive. In essence, 
“to” refines the question to ask whether the internship’s potential benefit 
induced the employer’s promise of an internship. 
In this scenario, Fred has secured an internship through Gary’s good 
will. Fred is conferring a benefit upon Gary—doing these small projects that 
Gary might have otherwise had to do himself—but Fred’s conferred benefit 
does not seem to have induced Gary’s promise.125 In other words, Gary did 
not give Fred the internship so that Fred could do small projects; Gary gave 
Fred the internship simply to help Fred. It just so happens that a condition 
for Fred to receive the gratuitous gift—Gary’s supervision and guidance—is 
that Fred must confer some benefit upon Gary—doing the small projects, 
which help him learn to be a carpenter. In contractual language, Gary gave 
Fred a conditional gratuitous promise. Under my test, this unpaid intern-
ship is valid because the condition to Gary’s promise was just that—a 
condition—and not full-blown consideration that induced Gary’s promise. 
Compliance with theoretical formalities, however, does not always bode 
well for practical application. Here, it seems the employer could often raise 
the assertion that the benefit received by him was not bargained for; it was 
just a condition to the gratuitous promise. More bluntly, the employer may 
be able to abuse the conditional-gratuitous-promise defense by saying 
something like, “The intern had to confer a benefit upon me in order to 
learn; I did not actually care about that benefit.” 
If this defense is raised, however, we can overcome its potential abuse by 
applying a comparative cost–benefit analysis.126 An employer’s receipt of 
 
125 Again, there will be evidentiary problems in discovering Gary’s ex ante intent, but not 
more than in any criminal or civil trial that requires a finding of intent. Factors helpful to making 
such a conclusion include whether the employer—ex post—receives a comparative cost–benefit 
advantage, whether the intern displaced a regular employee, whether the work environment was 
educational in nature, and typical kinds of evidence like emails, phone calls, and in-person 
conversations that display the true purpose of the relationship. 
126 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4 (claiming that the proper test for the 
legality of unpaid internships is whether “the per-hour cost to the employer of an intern . . . [exceeds] 
the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern” (emphasis omitted)).  
Though I think this test has great merit, in my view, it should be confined only to situations 
wherein the defense asserts that the employer really only offered a conditional gratuitous promise. 
Later, I discuss the danger of using it as the sole test for the legality of unpaid internships. For 
present purposes, I do not think that the “per-hour” metric is necessary and instead believe that a 
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some net benefit could be strong evidence that his promise actually was 
induced by the potential benefit of the internship, and therefore the intern 
is actually an employee who deserves a wage and protections against 
workplace discrimination and harassment. For the employer to receive a net 
benefit, the net difference between the costs and benefits of not having an 
intern must exceed the net difference between the costs and benefits of 
having an intern. Formulaically, B1 - C1 > B2 - C2.127 
I next apply this formula to our situation. For argument’s sake, there are 
ten projects for the internship, and they would each take Gary, who earns 
$50 an hour, thirty minutes. Each project, therefore, costs Gary—without 
Fred—$25. In total, they cost Gary $250. Fred, however, takes three hours to 
complete them. To make sure they are done properly and Fred is learning, 
Gary dedicates one hour personally to each one. For Gary with Fred, then, 
each project costs $50 in Gary’s labor plus the replacement value of any materi-
als Fred ruined during his learning curve, which comes to an average of $10 per 
project. Gary’s total cost of Fred’s internship, therefore, is $600, which exceeds 
the $250 cost of the small projects if Gary had not hired Fred. 
In sum, though Gary received Fred’s labor, which can be construed as a ben-
efit, Gary did not receive a net advantage. Rationally, this lack of a net advantage 
supports (though does not prove)128 the conclusion that Gary did not bargain for 
the consideration; it was merely a condition to his gratuitous promise. 
Therefore, this situation would pass my test because there was no mutually 
induced consideration. There was no exchange, and thus there was no valid 
contract that makes the intern an employee who deserves at least minimum wage. 
 
total cost–benefit analysis, ignoring hourly timeframes, is more appropriate. Moreover, note that 
my test is distinct because Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test focuses only on costs. See infra 
Section III.B.  
127 For this formula, B1 is the benefit for the scenario with an intern, while B2 is the benefit 
for the scenario without an intern. C1 is the cost for the scenario with an intern, while C2 is the 
cost for the scenario without an intern. 
128 No one factor or evidentiary consideration is dispositive. Rather, this inquiry will be more 
of a balancing test, which considers the totality of the circumstances. Again, other useful 
evidentiary factors are whether the intern displaced a regular employee, whether the work 
environment was educational in nature, and the typical kinds of evidence like emails, phone calls, 
and in-person conversations that display the true purpose of the relationship. 
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IV. CHALLENGES 
A. Challenge 1: Perversion of Contract Law 
Though I suggest that judges borrow from the law of contracts, my proposal 
runs counter to it because it calls for supernormal consideration.129 Essentially, 
the formation of a contract requires a bargain, to which the parties mutually 
assent, and consideration, which can most simply be thought of as “the receipt 
by the promisor of ‘something of value’ from the promisee.”130  
The beauty of the doctrine of consideration is that it is in accord with 
the human spirit. In the words of Adam Smith,  
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give 
me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning 
of every such offer . . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest.131 
The same reasoning applies to unpaid internships. Though the interns are 
not receiving money, they are still acting in their own self-interest. In 
exchange for providing the employer with their work product, they are 
receiving experience, connections, and credentials for their resumes—all of 
which will aid them in their eventual search for a paying job.132 Under the 
bargain theory of consideration, then, unpaid internships are valid contracts 
because each party—the employer and the intern—receives a benefit for 
which they bargained: the employer gets work from the intern, and the 
intern gets experience, a line on a resume, and networking opportunities 
from the employer.  
The Fact Sheet, the FLSA, and my test can be seen as unfairly favoring in-
terns because they require employers to provide supernormal consideration—
that is, on top of an intern receiving intangible benefits like experience, 
 
129 By “supernormal consideration,” I mean consideration that is not necessary for the parties 
to come to an agreement. For instance, if A promises to paint B’s house and B promises to wash A’s 
car in return, forcing B to pay A an additional sum would constitute supernormal consideration. 
130 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 121, at 12. A famous example of a unique mutual consideration 
situation is the case of Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). There, Hamer’s uncle said that if 
Hamer did not smoke or drink until he was twenty-one, he would give him $5000. Id. at 256. 
Hamer fulfilled his end of the bargain, so the court awarded him $5000—the return consideration 
for Hamer’s consideration of not smoking or drinking. Id. at 259. 
131 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 21-22 (London, Strahan & Cadell, 5th ed. 1789) (1776).  
132 See Jacobs, supra note 59; NACE, supra note 100 (finding that individuals who have held 
internships are “considerably more likely to receive a job offer than their counterparts who did not 
have any experiential education in their background”). 
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connections, and credentials, he must also receive at least $7.25 per hour. In 
this sense, my test is perverse to contract law because it casts aside otherwise 
valid, mutually beneficial agreements and demands that they include monetary 
consideration to be legal. Because the premise of contract law is that mutually 
beneficial contracts create a net gain to society and thus increase the aggregate 
welfare,133 the Fact Sheet and my test can be viewed as inhibiting such an 
increase, because they prohibit some mutually beneficial contracts. 
Though my proposal does deviate from traditional contract law, my goal 
is merely to borrow the doctrine of consideration, not to adhere to contract 
law completely. Ultimately, through my proposal, I seek to clarify and 
simplify the Fact Sheet so that judges have a workable standard to use when 
addressing the legality of unpaid internships. Moreover, policymakers have 
decided that nonmonetary consideration alone cannot satisfy the minimum 
wage.134 Therefore, though a bilateral exchange of consideration between an 
employer and an intern wherein the consideration conferred upon the intern 
is intangible may be valid under contract law, it contradicts the FLSA and 
thereby the policies Congress has established for our country.  
B. Challenge 2: Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s Proposal Is Superior 
In Not-So-Equal Protection: Reforming the Regulations of Student Internships, 
Kathryn Anne Edwards and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez propose a test for 
the legality of unpaid internships in which a court would “compare the per-
hour cost to the employer of an intern (through supervision and training) 
relative to the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern (through an 
intern’s production).”135 Under their proposal, if the cost exceeds the benefit, 
 
133 See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 121, at 2 (asserting that a contract “is a kind of joint under-
taking which increases the wealth of both parties and from which both emerge with a measure of 
enhanced utility”). 
134 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring wages of $7.25 per hour or 
more). It is worth asking, though, whether the use of nonmonetary consideration, such as prestige, 
is increasing in our country and perhaps should be considered valid under the FLSA. For example, 
a law student choosing to work for the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore over Cahill Gordon 
& Reindell exemplifies this choice. Each year, some top law students choose to work for Cravath 
over Cahill, despite Cahill’s superior compensation, presumably because Cravath provides them 
with superior intangible benefits like prestige and experience. See Elie Mystal, Associate Bonus 
Watch: Cahill Gordon DESTROYS the Cravath Bonus, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:16 p.m.), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/12/associate-bonus-watch-cahill-gordon-destroys-the-cravath-bonus 
(“[S]ome Cahill Gordon associates are going to take home total bonus money that’s $35,000 . . . more 
than Cravath associates.”). In this respect, one could argue that students are rationally choosing to 
forego monetary income and are instead opting for prestigious unpaid internships that carry 
advantageous nonmonetary consideration that will benefit them in the long run—just as some paid 
workers forego extra income to receive seemingly more valuable intangible benefits. 
135 Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
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the relationship is that of employer–intern; if the benefit exceeds the cost, 
the relationship is that of employer–employee, meaning that the intern 
should be compensated under the FLSA.136 In addition to this test, Edwards 
and Hertel-Fernandez also retain prongs one, three, five, and six (the 
prongs not pertaining to the primary beneficiary of the relationship) of the 
Fact Sheet.137 Though this idea has merit, retaining the first, third, and fifth 
prongs renders it underinclusive, too focused on actual costs as opposed to 
expected costs, impractical, and overly complicated. 
First, this test is underinclusive because it only focuses on the costs to 
the employer without considering the benefits. In their analysis, Edwards 
and Hertel-Fernandez assume that the benefit an intern confers upon her 
employer is equal to the cost to the employer of a comparable hire.138 In the 
simplest example, if an intern is working forty hours per week, doing work 
that the employer would otherwise have to hire a $10 per hour employee to 
do, the employer is benefitting $400 per week from the internship. Therefore, 
under Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test, the internship would require at 
least the minimum wage. 
Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez, however, rightly recognize that the costs of 
an internship are not as simplistic as those of the previous example.139 They 
therefore provide the following hypothetical: 
Because of the intern’s lack of experience, a regular worker must spend half 
of his time observing the intern’s work. If the regular worker’s normal com-
pensation is $25 an hour and he normally works 40 hours per week, then the 
total cost to the employer of having the intern is $3,500. If the intern works 
40 hours a week for seven weeks, and the wage of a comparable worker is 
$10 an hour, then the benefit to the employer is $2,800. In this case, the cost 
($3,500) exceeds the benefit ($2,800) so the intern does not legally have to 
be compensated, assuming that the other four tests were also met.140 
In line with their test, the authors view benefit only as the cost of hiring a 
comparable worker. This definition, however, is overly narrow because it 
ignores benefits like goodwill with the community, goodwill with clients, 
goodwill with the intern’s school, and industry-wide unpaid training.  
To further my argument, I tweak Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s 
hypothetical such that the cost of a comparable worker is $12.49 per hour 
 
136 Id. 
137 See id. (“We propose applying a new, straightforward, quantitative test to two of the most 
ambiguous but most important elements of the guidelines: points two . . . and four . . . .”). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 5. 
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and make the employer an investment management firm. After this change, 
the cost of having the intern remains at $3500 due to the cost of supervision, but 
the costs of not having the intern have risen to $3497.20 ($12.49 per hour  280 
hours). Still, this hypothetical passes their test because the cost of having the 
intern exceeds the cost of not having one by $2.80 ($3500 (the cost to the 
employer of having an intern) - $3497.20 (the cost of not having an intern)). 
Now, let us apply the above calculation to the facts of my previous hypo-
thetical concerning ABC Investments. ABC is located in a suburb of central 
New Jersey and hires ten unpaid interns each summer, eight of whom are 
sophomores from Princeton University and two of whom are the daughters 
of wealthy clients. By having this hiring practice in place, the firm operates 
at an immediate loss of $28 per summer (-$2.80 per intern  10 interns); 
however, this scheme generates considerable goodwill for the company with 
respect to Princeton University, the community, and clients, and provides 
industry-wide, cost-free training. 
Thus, using Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s concept of “cost,” ABC’s 
unpaid internships are valid because they impose a net cost to ABC of $28 
per summer, but in reality, the unpaid internships may increase ABC’s 
bottom line by tens of thousands of dollars in the long run.141 As a result, 
their test is underinclusive in that it would not prohibit exploitative unpaid 
internships that confer great benefits upon employers, because it focuses 
only on costs, not benefits. My mutually induced consideration test, to the 
contrary, would forbid such exploitative internships because it takes into 
account both costs and benefits. Under my test, ex post benefits from 
unpaid internships, like long-term increases to an employer’s profits, can be 
evidence of an ex ante intent to receive a benefit from the intern.  
Second, their test is flawed because its focus is only ex post as opposed to 
ex ante. Under an ex post review, interns could receive unequal treatment 
depending on their level of production.142 For example, hypothetical 
Hometown News hired John and Nancy as unpaid interns, expecting them to 
confer a benefit upon Hometown News by doing free editing. The cost of hiring 
a paid editor would be $10 per hour, and they each work ten hours per day. Thus, 
the “benefit” to Hometown News under the Edwards and Hertel-Ferndandez 
 
141 To arrive at the “thousands of dollars” conclusion, I assumed that the investment firm 
would have paid each intern $7.25 per hour, 40 hours a week, ten weeks a year. Because there are 
ten interns in the hypothetical who are working for free, that amounts to a savings of $29,000. 
Even this figure, though, is conservative. The firm would also be benefitting from better services 
and more clients, most likely resulting in lower costs and more revenue. 
142 The heart of this critique of Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test is identical to my dis-
cussion of why the focus in my test is whether, ex ante, the employer sought a benefit. See supra 
Section III.C. 
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test is $200 per day (2  ($10  10 hours)). The monitoring cost to 
Hometown News differs depending on the intern, however. John requires 
no monitoring, but Nancy requires five hours of attention from Dave, the 
supervisor, who makes $40 per hour. Thus, John’s net benefit is $100 per day 
to Hometown News, but Nancy’s net benefit to Hometown News is $0 per 
day ($100 benefit - ($20 monitoring costs  5 hours)). 
Ex post, therefore, John would require payment under the Edwards and 
Hertel-Ferndandez test, but Nancy would not—even though, ex ante, 
Hometown News anticipated deriving a net benefit from both interns. This 
result eliminates Hometown News’s risk of hiring incompetent interns, 
which is problematic because it is saving money in the long run by reducing 
due diligence costs. 
Third, their test is impracticable. The defendant in Glatt v. Fox Search-
light Pictures, Inc. proposed a similar “‘primary benefit test,’ [which would 
require] determining whether ‘the internship’s benefits to the intern out-
weigh the benefits to the engaging entity.’”143 The court rejected the 
proposal, calling it “unmanageable.”144 Judge Pauley of the Southern District 
of New York reasoned that such a test is “subjective and unpredictable” 
because “the very same internship position might be compensable as to one 
intern, who took little from the experience, and not compensable as to 
another, who ‘learned a lot.’”145 
Finally, the Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez test is overly complicated 
because it retains the first, third, and fifth prongs of the Fact Sheet’s test. As 
I previously discussed, these prongs are unnecessary because they are 
derivatives of the second and fourth prongs, which deal with the costs and 
benefits of the internship. The third prong is particularly redundant in this 
context, since it asks whether the intern displaces a regular employee,146 and 
their test requires that the cost of a comparable employee be calculated. 
Under their test, then, if a comparable employee would be more costly than 
an unpaid intern, the intern necessarily displaces a regular employee, 
rendering the third prong superfluous.  
In conclusion, though calculating the costs to the employer of having 
and not having an intern may be useful in determining the ex ante motiva-
tion of the employer for the purposes of my test, Edwards and Hertel-
Fernandez’s overall proposal is flawed because it does not take into account 
 
143 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 11, 2013). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“The intern does not displace regular employees, but 
works under close supervision of existing staff.”). 
  
2013] To Benefit or Not to Benefit 201 
 
important benefits like goodwill and reduced training costs that unpaid 
interns confer upon employers. Furthermore, the notion that this comparative 
cost test should be used in conjunction with the first, third, and fifth prongs 
of the Fact Sheet is overly complicated and redundant. 
CONCLUSION 
While working on Black Swan, which grossed over $300 million, Alex 
Footman took out the garbage, swept floors, and got coffee for the crew.147 
For his efforts, he received no compensation.148 Natalie Portman, the film’s 
lead actress, received $2 million.149 My proposal is not that Alex should 
make as much—or even a tenth as much—as the Oscar-winning Portman. I 
only suggest that he receive at least $7.25 per hour and have standing to 
bring a harassment or discrimination lawsuit. 
The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an em-
ployer.”150 “Employ,” under FLSA, means to “suffer or permit to work.”151 
The court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,152 however, narrowed this 
definition so that “employ” does not “make all persons employees who, 
without any express or implied compensation agreement, may work for their 
own advantage on the premises of another.”153 In response to heightened 
criticism of unpaid internships, the Department of Labor released the Fact 
Sheet to clarify when an intern is an “employee” deserving minimum wage 
and overtime rates. 
This Fact Sheet, however, proposes a complicated and redundant six-point 
test accompanied by muddled notes that will make rendering a decision for 
judges in upcoming lawsuits unnecessarily difficult, thereby increasing the 
chances of incorrect verdicts.154 This risk of preventing legal unpaid intern-
ships and especially of allowing illegal ones is dangerous to our society. Legal 
unpaid internships, if prevented, will deprive our labor force of an effective 
source of training. Illegal unpaid internships, if allowed, will financially hurt 
interns, distribute discriminatory benefits among different socioeconomic 
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classes, increase the unemployment rate, and fail to provide interns with 
statutory protection from workplace discrimination and harassment.  
To avoid these problems, I propose a simpler, cleaner test for judges to 
use. If the employer and intern expect, ex ante, to receive a benefit from one 
another, then a valid employment relationship has been formed. This 
relationship deserves at least the minimum wage and gives standing to the 
intern to file a harassment or discrimination lawsuit. If only the intern 
expects to receive a benefit, then the employer is conferring a gift upon the 
intern, and the intern need not be paid.155 
The primary advantage of my proposal is that it gives judges an easy to 
use, accurate test that will reduce costs to society such as a higher unemploy-
ment rate, an inefficient work force, and interns who are unwarrantedly 
burdened with steep financial costs. Furthermore, my hope is that if this 
test creates meaningful judgments against employers who are exploiting 
interns, more unpaid interns will surmount the fear of retribution and 
launch lawsuits against their employers, and companies will be deterred 
from installing illegal unpaid internship programs in the first place.  
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